The Mark of Oppression: Jews and Homosexuals as Strangers*

As my career as a psychoanalyst draws to a close, comments multiply regarding my "practical experiences." Analysands sometimes manifest their idealizing transference as well as their fear that their position is hopeless and their accompanying feeling of impotence, so that even at the beginning of their treatment the weight of their own experience does not coincide with their self-evaluations. Younger colleagues do not simply allude to my long experience; there is often an undercurrent of envy of the acquired knowledge that has brought me prestige and authority. Likewise, envy is stirred up in me, with the melancholy undertone, "If you only knew! I would withdraw gladly from this position, had I the future ahead of me as you do." Both life's experience and fascination emanate from the activity of the analyst. When envy fades away, the voice of conscience can be heard to say, "But one should let one's experience teach someone else; one should pass it on." It is then that those who are envious can get that which they do not have; that which I have is made legitimate. And, as any performance of a duty inevitably causes, my damaged narcissistic balance is restored anew. I was once able to gain this narcissistic advantage with a clinical study about the termination of analyses (Parin, 1981a), which is a subject that obviously presupposes many years of psychoanalytic work.


The ethnopsychoanalytic essay on the comparison of Jews and homosexuals that is about to be set forth has yet another motivation. Once before (based on experiences in our private psychoanalytic practices in Zurich), we set forth observations of two similar groups of analysands who, although comparable, were, when viewed from another perspective, clearly differentiatable (Parin and Parin-Matthèy, 1976). Though there we dealt with therapeutic analyses, and though the ethnopsychoanalytic investigation came only later, when we examined the similarities of the two
groups of analysands, the results were compelling. I maintain that we came to sufficiently meaningful conclusions precisely because, by dint of these efforts of therapy and research, which were theoretically unified, things were also blended together practically.

The apparent paradox that just the absence of a specific objective brings about social psychological findings disappears when one reminds oneself of Freud's (1930) writings in which he scrutinizes civilization. Insight gained in but a few therapeutic analyses (including his self-analysis) were the invisible scaffolding on which Freud built his comprehensive and profound critique of culture. Here and there, one can certainly object to his direct or, rather, too direct, application of psychoanalytic interpretations, arguments by analogy, and extrapolations from the individual to the community, even to the whole process of civilization. All in all, however, this new way of thinking, this unprecedented style of endeavor to understand human affairs, hinged on the validity of his vision of culture. Only a few authors, such as Eissler (1975) (who may be the last of them), were as significantly capable of making use of their encompassing education and view the world as did Freud in his exceptional fashion. Other psychoanalysts who were interested in the illumination of historical, social, and political relationships tried to circumscribe the field of observation and focus. The ethnopsychoanalysts, among whom I count myself, gave themselves over mostly to the task of describing the analyses of individuals who shared something in common. The methodological artifice that applies in this case is: membership in a well-defined subculture and the formulation of the problem are restricted to a field that can be overviewed in its entirety. The process of the research thereby remains the same: from analyses of individuals, findings are extracted that serve to elucidate what takes place in communities or other groups. The leap from individual to culture can not be made properly by casual exactitude or the statistical validation of the observed data. The heuristic value of such research rests on the sufficiently ensured assumption that social relationships in all events are significant

in the conscious and unconscious psyche of the subject who is a part of the social group in question and who has been socialized in it.

In the research to be described here, members of two subcultures assimilated Jews and male homosexuals, Swiss as well as of other Western countries—will be compared. From the midst of the discoveries attained in the process, the following problem will be posed: How does symbolically mediated oppression occur and what effect does it bring about?
The procedure is highly individual: on one hand, there are a few analysands; on the other, myself, the author. Before we investigate both of the subcultures to be compared, I must clarify my own role and meaning to the extent to which these play a part in the investigation beyond my subjective experience.

I am three things: a scientific investigator; a part and a member of a society, culture and subculture, class, and segment that are similar to those of the subjects of my research or to one of another group; and I am the object of transference. In such an undertaking the scientific observer has to be more aware than in any other research that in absence he is the subject; that the choice of the topic, the method, and the process of the investigation even the results are intimately tied in with his personal life story. In this regard, the product of the research is comparable to the creation of a biography.

The reason I have chosen to use the English title "The Mark of Oppression" requires explanation, aside from the fact that it is difficult to translate into German. I continue to have a highly cathected emotional need to expose the pernicious consequences of political, social, racial, and any other kind of oppression. Kardiner and Ovesey (1951) introduced the title in their study of the oppression of the Negro in the United States, an oppression that took place under very different historical and social circumstances. Sociopsychologically, hardly any of the statements of that study concern themselves directly with my current theme. (1) As is well-known, Kardiner and Ovesey were associated with the psychoanalytically oriented discipline of American cultural anthropology, the neo-Freudians who espoused the position that the human is born a tabula rasa whose personality is determined totally by his cultural experiences. When I first read their work, Goldy Parin-Matthèy, Fritz Morgenthaler, and I had begun our West African ethnopsychoanalytic investigations. I found their arguments seductive to a degree but was critical then of their methods and for the most part have abandoned those arguments.

It is my concern to understand the oppressed. Why not those issues social, rank, class, subculture, ethnicity -that are instrumental in perpetuating the oppression? That would be-I can hear you exhorting me to heed -much more significant. In that regard, there already exist exhaustive earlier studies, the most extensive of which are those of Adorno and collaborators (1950), and much is in

---

(1) Editors’ note: Manson’s (1988) recent study places Kardiner’s contributions in a proper perspective, which has been obscured by sometimes ad hominem statements by both psychoanalysts and anthropologist on the basis of emotional biases.
the work of Mitscherlich (1968, 1969). I have also attempted to characterize oppressive institutions and politically reactionary factions sociopsychologically. For what reasons can I not decide to investigate oppressors "scientifically"? I cannot hide from the fact that strong affects come into play. I can assert, in the sense of a rationalization, the dominant rulers and even the masses-at-large, who stand on the side of the oppressors, are hardly represented among my analysands. Whenever in the analyses racism or aggressive rejection of homosexuality arose, the analytic clarification soon concerned itself with the distortions and mutilations of the mind that manifest themselves as delusionally tinged prejudices. One can hardly expect to elucidate a common unconscious motivation for that aggressive-oppressive stance which shows up in the main as socially induced, collectively sanctioned compensatory phenomena. More important, in the attempt to understand the "oppressor" scientifically, my rage and impatience, my defense against my own feelings of impotence and helplessness, impede my objectivity and tempt me to act rather than to analyze objectively.

All of this brings us to the second role that devolves upon me during the investigation, namely, that of the person who belongs versus the stranger in the subculture. Since my origin, though not my socialization, is Jewish, I belong decidedly in the group of Jews who are being studied. Since I am not a practicing homosexual, I am a stranger to the homosexual subculture. Is this asymmetry decisive? Am I defined on one hand as one who belongs, and on the other as a stranger?

In the conscious and unconscious expectations of analysands and through the emergence of the transference, such role assignments are unavoidable. In the course of analyses, especially with respect to the emergence of the countertransference, it matters in what sense and to what extent I experience myself as one belonging to the same group or as a stranger. The image of "stranger," the imago, or -according to the libidinal cathexes-the representative "the strange," determines my proximity to or distance from either group. Ever since Erdheim (1982) elucidated the development of this representative and described its establishment in the adolescent psyche (a process to which I shall return with respect to the subjects in this study), it has become obvious to me that I feel approximately equidistant from both groups and that I belong to both as well, and why that is so. Without tracing back my psychic development, I may note: Jewishness fell within the scope (the imago) of "the strange" in my puberty. At the age of about 16 I was labeled a Jew as a consequence of racial legislation and thrust into the corresponding social role. The earlier steps to develop a sense of identity were not thereby extinguished. Thenceforth, I "knew" that I was a Jew
without the emotional meaning that this knowledge entails in the majority of Jewish men from the educated middle class in Central Europe.

Homosexual striving rose to my awareness at the same age but led neither to my "coming out" as a part of the homosexual subculture nor to its denial or repression. Instead, I had several homosexual involvements until my late adolescence (infatuations and sexual experiences). Because my earlier psychosexual development had pressed toward an heterosexual orientation, a homosexual orientation as is often the case -did not prevail. I felt none of the strangeness in the world of male homosexuals that often begins to take root when one succeeds during one's adolescence in denying homosexual urges. Homosexuals never became my "strangers." The analogy to the group "Jews" is that, subjectively, I both belonged and did not belong to it. The role ascriptions and expectations of the analysands of both groups therefore did not correspond to my own sense of identity, an advantageous prerequisite that allowed me to remain conscious of countertransference feelings.

"While I cannot unmask and break the arrogance of repression, I will strive to recognize it in its negatives, the damage and defeat which it brings about in such a way bringing about hope for its downfall" (P. P.: a fancy quotation from Theodor Adorno).

II

Several Jewish patients chose me as their analyst because they knew I was Jewish. A few homosexuals were induced to undertake psychoanalysis with me because they knew about my progressive and liberal orientation. The development of the transference was influenced by this initial situation, but -as far as I can tell in no case was it influenced substantially. For each separate analysand, I represented, during the course of the analytic process, at times a member of his group and other times a "stranger."

The investigation focused on adult male analysands. It may be a matter of chance that I did not treat any Jewish women who grew up in the relatively tolerant German and French-Swiss environment. An unconscious motive was perhaps responsible for this; namely, that I only apparently accidentally did not want to treat any women psychoanalytically who would by virtue of their origins and social status remind me of my mother or sister. The Jewish women I did treat suffered extreme persecution during the war years and in the Hitler Regime; their psychological problems were utterly different from those of the men I treated. Not only do female homosexuals
differ from male homosexuals psychologically, but the extent of social discrimination that effects them is not comparable to that to which homosexual men are exposed. Both Jews and homosexuals lend themselves to comparative ethnopsychoanalytic investigation. Public and private discrimination gives rise to a psychological similarity; cultural and social differences result in an ethnological strangeness between both groups, as will be elucidated soon. It is popularly held that from the outset homosexuals and Jews are different. They bear an irremediable flaw from birth. Traditional Christian condemnation applies to both; the one as sinners who pander to satanic desires, and the others as collectively responsible for the original sin of sentencing Christ to the cross. The extensively shared point of view held by the citizenry that practiced legal and social discrimination has affected both groups throughout Western Christian civilization; the Jews were condemned as a subculture, and homosexuals, who had not yet banded together in their own subculture, as individuals. Ever since the Age of Enlightenment, but especially after the French Revolution, there came to be a broadly based counterclaim. Especially in Western countries, legal discrimination against Jews has been decreasing, although in most cases for local groups and financially elevated social strata only. The Dreyfus Affair of 1894 brought about a deep rift in French politics and in the public opinion of the entire civilized world. (2) When that verdict was revised in 1906, a majority of the liberal contemporaries thought that sentence was the last attempt at discrimination against Jews in a law-abiding state; the penal servitude for homosexuality to which Oscar Wilde was sentenced in the following year motivated only a few writers to protest. Pogromlike outbreaks against Jews, unhindered by the authorities, and, in Eastern Europe, frequently

(2) Editor's note: see Encyc. Brit., 1963

21 encouraged, continued. When assaults on individual Jews or homosexuals occurred, the courts generally treated the victims as though they were less worthy of judicial protection than were other people. I present this overview in order to stress that the deliberate and perpetrated annihilation of Jews and the repression of homosexuals during the Third Reich were linked intimately with a prevalent tradition. My investigation took place in a relatively tolerant society. In Switzerland the last legal discrimination against Jews, namely, the prohibition against Kosher slaughter was struck from the Constitution but is included in the animal protection ordinance of the Confederation of March 9,
1978 (Art. 20), whereby cruelty against animals was made punishable by imprisonment or fines up to 20,000 francs. The official voice of public opinion with respect to values and evaluations, namely, those in power, churches, and newspapers, have for the past 40 years abstained from every expression of anti-Semitism. I need not spell out from what historical and cultural development this is derived.

It may be less well known that in German-speaking countries, among which Switzerland can be counted, an attempt has long been underway to do away with all overt and legal discrimination against homosexuals. Out of all the appeals and recommendations dealing with the problems attendant on legally sanctioned persecution of homosexuals, let us recall the petition of the "Scientific-Humanitarian Committee," which was drawn up by the sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld in 1897. It was put before the legislative bodies in 1897 and eventually resulted in a resolution of the legislative committee on justice of the Reichstag in 1929 that made so-called simple homosexual behavior unpunishable. This petition was signed by many individuals of that time, including, August Bebel, Karl Kautsky, Paul Löbe, Hermann Müller, Walter Rathenau; Robert Bosch, Martin Buber, Alfred Döblin, Albert Einstein, Gerhart Hauptmann, Karl Jaspers, Alfred Kerr, Käthe Kollwitz, Max Liebermann, Heinrich Mann, Thomas Mann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Heinrich Zille, Stefan Zweig; Franz von Liszt, Wolfgang Mittmaier, Gustav Radbruch; Gustav von Bergmann, Albert Neisser, and Rodolf Virchow. I am taking this historical reminiscence from the "Call for the Decriminalization of Homosexuality," which was published in West Germany in 1981 and which claims the abolition of legal code 175 (StGB), whereby "homosexual conduct ...in comparison with heterosexual conduct, was specifically criminalized, where the legal underage boundary was fixed at 18 years of age." This proclamation too was underwritten by a great number of highly regarded personalities of the cultural and intellectual community, among them the most prominent psychoanalytic physicians of West Germany. In Switzerland there exists the same legal discrimination, the 1942 Criminal Code, not containing any sanctions against homosexuality regarding "adults" but which fixes the "age of culpability" likewise at 18 years of age and also labels the sexual conduct between men between 16 and 18 years "unnatural lewdness," punishable by law (194, StGB), while the same behavior with male persons under 16 years old, labeled "lewdness with children," is punished more severely.

The few and less drastic legal norms of defamation have a twofold function. On one hand, they are supposed to demarcate and circumscribe official tolerances. On the other hand, more
importantly, moral norms that make defamation possible are symbols signifying that one, through one's tolerance, subscribes to the defamation, "who is silent, consents."

A culture defines itself most clearly through symbols and symbolic systems, with which it communicates itself to its members (Geertz, 1973). According to Lincke (1981), symbols are the conveyances of meaning, which, irrespective of their actual merit, are accorded an immutable significance when they hold true in a group or a community and when they are vaunted from time to time. Jews and homosexuals are symbols for inferior, eschewable persons, even inciting disgust and disdain as "less than human." Such symbols unbridle aggression in the form of the wish to differentiate oneself from them (Jews and homosexuals), to segregate, and ultimately physically annihilate them. By way of the defense mechanisms of projection and projective identification, they are turned into objects of aggression. (3) These mechanisms operate especially in the collective; they serve as an identificatory merger. Insofar as there exists a need for further boosting of such symbols, the reference back to traditions and to the still applicable legal defamation lends itself to the enhancement and to the maintenance of that meaning.

Intrapsychically, the defense against unconscious homosexual wishes, and, vis a vis Jews, fantasies regarding their economic and intellectual power or their sexual potency and licentiousness operates as an amplifier of envy and other forms of aggression.

My analysands have experienced relatively little directly of the aggression potential that exists in the culture in which they live. Socially, Jews and -in the culture of educated petty bourgeois and urban bourgeoisie -even homosexuals have to deal with indirect, displaced, or covert aggression. The life choices of the Jews among my analysands were inconspicuous, except, when it came to their choice of school, occupation, promotions on the job, love lives, or their choice of mate,

(3) Editor’s note: See Volkan (1988).

and ultimately the summits of advancements in public positions and prestigious posts around which especially Zurich Jews took frequent and typical detours. The mobility and stratification of social organization were sufficient that preexistent and operant discrimination at one or another field could be avoided, often before it could become conscious. Younger Jews, who took part in Jewish organizations and who spent some time in Israel during their years in school, who were consciously proud of their Jewishness and who were admired in part by their non-Jewish peers as being members of a brave, efficient small group, aligned themselves, biographically, on the same track as had those before them who had grown up shortly after the second World War. The careers
of homosexuals naturally were, from the moment of choice of an occupation, marked by the "avoidance behavior" Dannecker and Reiche (1974) have written about.

With respect to the development of the psyche and emergence of conflicts, the expressions of aggression that people encountered in school (from schoolmates and teachers), in places of training, at work, in their love life, or in other social connections, such as sports, the military, and social life were of prime importance. Direct physical aggression seldom occurred. Direct threats were equally infrequent. Allusions with suggestive or overt concurrence by an audience occurred without fail and recurred until they were mature adults. Without exception they were consciously understood as being abased. Jews and homosexuals "knew," in comparable ways, that they were discriminated against. Only in this light can it be comprehended how reaction formations against aggression, which is what was shown to them, ultimately came to be understood as an assault. Overbearing friendliness, gratuitous obligingness, avoidance of the use of such words as "Jew" or "gay" in the presence of the affected, or the embarrassment of those who had allowed such breaches of tact, all of these colored the climate to which my Jewish and homosexual analysands were exposed in school, in the military, on the job, or in social life. Naturally, for both groups aggressivity was more obvious and rough in socially underprivileged groupings than in more sophisticated or educated social strata, where it was more delicate or disguised.

Thus, Jews and homosexuals encountered discrimination that was really fundamentally similar, even though the external conditions were not the same. It is not for this reason, however, that I compare them. Only the fact that in the analyses a deep-seated, multifaceted psychological similarity surfaced justifies the comparison. The disposition to certain typical conflicts, structural, and dynamic peculiarities was

24

recognizable as a result of discrimination, irrespective of the individual fortunes and relatively independently of the familial circumstances. In other words, quite different men who are subject to a particular form of discrimination are likely to develop similar psychological traits.

The difference of both groups is so obvious that I need not say much about it. The Jews in Zurich either belonged to the "liberal" religious community or had abandoned any religious commitment before they engaged in psychoanalysis. So minimally was their familial or social activity stamped with traditional religiousness or Jewishness that one can describe them as only barely belonging to their own subculture. The analysands came from assimilated Swiss families or overassimilated families of the middle class or the upper middle class. It is not an exaggeration to say that with the Jews it was a matter of belonging to a minority, a genuine group that was publicly and legally
recognized but whose members lived outside of their families in a climate of discrimination, or, expressed positively, of relative tolerance.

The male homosexuals whom I treated came from quite varied social strata; one was the son of a farmer, another the son of a laborer. The occupational background of the homosexuals was not so very different from that of the Jewish patients. Yet, of course, all of the homosexuals had initially identified themselves socially as homosexuals in their adolescence or later. Only then did they find themselves to be members of a formed subculture resting on no familial, religious, or similar tradition.

III

Irrespective of what had brought the analysands my way, whatever their conscious motivation might have been to undertake analysis, eventually each one of them expressed the conviction, "my analysis is doomed to fail." Every one of them, Jews as well as homosexuals, was convinced that he was afflicted with an inborn, irreparable "defect." For that reason, so it seemed to them, their analyses ran aground. With Jews the "birth-flaw" was evident; no camouflaging, no adaptation, no active resistance was possible in the face of the ubiquitous prejudice they encountered, or believed to be evident, even in the mildest, virtually unrecognizable forms of dissimulation that were, in effect, anti-Semitism in its reverse. And all their problems, inclusive the trauma or conflict-generating experiences with parents or siblings in infancy or childhood, were at some point attributed to their Jewish origin, and the disturbing

or distressing sequels-depressive feelings, fears, or shame-were equally inescapable for the same reason.

Homosexuals had an additional problem with their "basic flaw." They worried that the analyst wished to "cure" them, to turn them into heterosexuals. This was not only unwanted, but also impossible without mangling their personalities and subjugating their feelings. When, by degrees, after repeated periods of doubt, they ultimately came to the conclusion that a "cure" of their homosexuality was neither the aim nor within the scope of their analyses, their situation was not appreciably better than that of the Jews. The presumed defect with which they were born, the direct and incalculable multiple results of shunning, contempt, and aggression, which they experienced and came to expect constantly, foreclosed the success of the analysis with respect to their personal satisfaction and their problems in life. It seemed quite striking and difficult to interpret, that not only experiences that had occurred only since puberty or since the conscious
realization of homosexual tendencies, which often were already present in latency, but also the traumatic experiences in early childhood, especially those during the separation from the mother, were attributed to homosexuality and "therefore" experienced as irreparable, durable, and immutable.

A second similarity in the analysis has to do with a transference fantasy, which, quite analogously, emerged with all the Jews and homosexuals: the question as to whether the analyst is 'similar' or different. Naturally, whether one can trust someone in a given situation is important for the sake of conscious, reasonable judgment. It should not come as a surprise that Jews often prefer to go to a non-Jewish analyst and homosexuals seek out an analyst who is known to be a heterosexual, or, for example, a married analyst. The most varied motives merge together in this choice, whereby self-contempt, contempt for the one afflicted with the same "birth-flaw," as well as the desire to come face to face with the presumed adversary, may actually become manifest. The problem of choice is always shaped by these fantasies: the question arose in every case, quite unrelated to whether the analysand knew the real state with his analyst. It is not just the question itself alone but deep longings, despair that a stranger who could not completely understand could also not help him; or, in its obverse, the hope, the conviction and the despair -yet again that one who suffers from the same "complexes" would never help him to set himself free from them. Frequently a "yes-it's-so" and "no-it's-not-so" situation would arise whereby the analyst was experienced sometimes to be similar to the patient and at other times not with respect to his status by virtue of birth.

If the analyst were homosexual, then a homosexual man might become angry and disappointed, fearing that in the eyes of his analyst his most precious uniqueness would be lost and hence all support and the interest he evoked lost as well. Were the analyst heterosexual, then his esteem and sympathy would not be genuine, would be feigned or, at the very least, would be evidence of a resigned tolerance; the analysand was likely to perceive the same excessive or inadequate forbearance he had been made to feel time and time again to be evidence of repressed aggression. Likewise, Jewish analysands could neither maintain a concept of the analyst as an also-Jew, nor accept that, as a non-Jew, he would really understand and assess the special Jewishness of the tribulations of his analysand, the attitudes, the fears and the demands of the parents. The reversal from the fantasy "the analyst is similar" to "he is different" did not always come about as a result of a narcissistic mortification. The deepening of the transferential feelings alone sufficed to make that fantasy appear irrelevant or unreal and brought about a reversal for a shorter or longer period.
of time. Analysts cannot doubt the existence of these phenomena when we have such examples as one Jewish analysand who once told me, "You are a Jew, of that I am sure, but not a real one," or the homosexual who said, "Well you may not be a homosexual, but being an analyst, sexuality is in your view not significant anyway."

In the countertransference one notices, possibly to a greater degree than with analysands who are neither Jewish nor homosexual, the intense desire that the analyst ought to identify with the suffering, fears, and unfulfillable longings of his patients. If it becomes possible, since it is necessary in the service of promoting the analysis, to take back the empathic identifications, then transference resistances unavoidably come into play. With regard to homosexuals, the sudden reversal of phallic rivaling to anal-passive transference states has been described elsewhere (Morgenthaler, 1961/62). Jews seem to me, independently of other conflict formations, prone to transfer alternately, or even simultaneously, sadistic and masochistic feelings. Not infrequently, one cannot discern whether these feelings revolve around the mother, the father, or yet another childhood caretaker. (Obviously, it is advisable to combine simultaneously in the interpretive process both components of such ambivalent transference feelings.) These analysands seem particularly vulnerable and liable to be aggrieved. It is difficult to determine whether what has been said is correct. One must recognize that Jews as well as homosexuals, even during advancement of the analytic process, experience themselves as damaged and genuinely defective in relation to the strangers, the different ones.

As much as I realized that the similarity between Jews and homosexuals revolved during the course of their analyses around analogous discrimination (which may be called relative tolerance), I was for a long while unable to describe and compare apparent similarities of the vicissitudes of the drives, the defense organization, and especially, of the self-esteem and self-image that Erikson (1959) calls identity. Again and again, when I compared experiences between one and the other, there rose to the foreground, in an unmistakable fashion to which I shall return presently, points of difference in familial circumstances as well as in their adult lives. The contributions of Erdheim (1982) on adolescence, especially his concept of the "Imago of the stranger" (Erdheim, 1984), or the representative of the "stranger/strangers," first made it possible for me to carry out this comparison and structure the similarities. It is my tentative conclusion that "the image of the stranger" stamps the mark of oppression on the psyche. Erdheim concurred with Freud that the family is in opposition to the general culture, at least to the extent that emotional ties with the family counteract turning toward the strange and the unfamiliar. This antagonism, claims
Erdheim, takes full effect when social conditions and sexual maturation after puberty call for the young man (we are dealing here only with male analysands) to orient himself outwardly, away from the family to society, and to seek his libidinally and aggressively conflicted objects outside the family.

This representative, the imago of the stranger, has a long history in the development of the psyche. The stranger is first differentiated from the trusted mother during the stranger-anxiety phase, beginning at about eight months. The reattachment phase (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975) and "refueling" can be released by confrontations with the strange. In the oedipal conflict of the young boy, the intruding agent who invades the dyad and lays claim to the mother becomes a prototype of the stranger. This representation mayor will be cathected with the ambivalence that originates in the oedipal conflict. Attributes and traits of the father image may be masked, its content covered up and replaced by new experiences. The emotional cathexis remains. The image of the stranger has become a representative.

During latency, as a rule, the unfamiliar outside world, especially school, is experienced as alien, with positive feelings felt toward the peer group and negative ones for male and female teachers. However, experiences with both groups release the ambivalence that is reserved for "strangers." In puberty and adolescence the strange and strangers become, or may become, the privileged surround. Soon the youngsters turn their feelings, longings, and hope for satisfaction to the unfamiliar.

Anxieties and rebuffs accompany this reorientation, yes, sometimes the loss of intimacy, security, or love that could force a return "to the bosom of the family," often to one of the people who raised them, usually the mother. This back-and-forth process, which is often described as the disentanglement of adolescents from their families, results, if it leads to the establishment of the identity of the adult, to integrative processes. It becomes possible to find one's own place "abroad" and, at best, to cathect objects that are found there positively according to the new reality. In youth groups "traitors" are often discovered, unmasked, and cast off. A particular hatred is also shown toward "traitors" in organizations and in adult institutional groups. The traitor at first had the meaning of the familiar, the intimate. Against this background the image of the stranger emerges. Confusion and disappointment magnify the aggressive feelings that the betrayal has freed up. The terror is reminiscent of the stranger anxiety of the eight-month-old infant. With homosexuals, as with Jews, there regularly emerges a particular disturbance during adolescence. Coincident with the realization of homosexual orientation -and all the more with
"coming out" -which has been found to take place without exception during the adolescent years, there is no possibility of a temporary return to the family. Hence, just as strangers react with overt or covert, but palpable, rejection and aggression toward the queerness of the young man, he now anticipates that he will be treated by his own family as the cast-off. The fear of experiencing the new way of being "outside" but also among his folks is so great that an inhibition of homosexuality arises, and he wishes to be a son again, if only temporarily. This inhibition occurs irrespective of whether there prevails within the family a climate of tolerance or one of puritanical austerity with respect to sexual matters. As soon as he has tentatively separated himself from his family, they seem to be more distant, as if they were strangers. Thenceforward, until the homosexual enters the social scene, which one can characterize as a partial subculture, he is not allowed to feel that he belongs to a group. His whole subsequent existence is marked; he will be the one who is not equal, not accepted, not loved. As he tries to construct a homosexual familial partnership, deep disappointments lie in store. As soon as a love object is cathexed who embodies the representation of the familial, the trusted and trustworthy, there simultaneously arises the representation of the stranger with whom it is not possible to have a trusting relationship. No way of compensation for the defect can bring about the dissolution of the socially stigmatizing "birth flaw" in the representation of the self.

Very much in keeping with their familial ideology, the Jewish analysands had to accept that the world outside was always non-Jewish the strange -of which one should beware, to which should adjust, where one should hide, which one should defend, endure, and "keep cool." Whenever, and however, eventually the step was taken out into the world-at-large, one difficulty, a result of the separation, was unavoidable; a trip outside and then back, a trial to see which world would suit one better, was not possible. Once one was outside, in the world of the gojim, the Christians, one could not return to where one had been before. Except within the ghetto, or within the religious Jewish family, the adolescent or young man would now view his family through the eyes of the strangers. Of course, not totally; consciously he would not reject them. A portion of the ambivalence that was felt toward strangers would now shift unavoidably toward the family.

It seems to me to be of prime importance that none of the analysands of whom I speak came from a Jewish family whose own relationship to the Jewish tradition was one of unbroken adherence to it. To the contrary, fear of being discovered to be Jewish, of being judged or condemned as Jewish, concealing one's Jewish name or one's occupation, so as to "pass" unobtrusively,
characterized the climate that prevailed in these families. Or else the family exaggerate their Jewish habitus, which nevertheless were devoid of social, spiritual, or emotional ties to Jewish tradition. When Jewish adolescents made the attempt, subsequently, to return to the bosom of such a family, they could find neither security nor refuge nor the feeling of being loved. And that kind of support is precisely what they would require for their stepping into the world-at-large and the establishment of their identities.

It sometimes appeared as if young Jewish men, after attempting to integrate into the non-Jewish world around them, could return unaffected into the bosom of the family, could establish durable new ties with these persons, and again adopt the values cherished there and make them their own. But analysis revealed early on how ambivalent was the image of the parents and siblings, how permeated it was with the strange. For instance, an apparently traditional and relatively tightly religiously bonded family would see to it that all the children spoke a particularly pure ancestral Züri-Dütsch (indigenous Swiss German), such as was the custom in long-established gentile families. The son returning home would be criticized and would feel estranged. In two other assimilated Jewish families, where there were children of Christian-Jewish mixture, the ones returning home from the "outside" encountered total denial of their Jewish roots and even of the annihilation of the Jews in the Third Reich. When the children were small nothing was said about the events

30 that had occurred; relatives who had lost their lives to the Nazi terror were no longer mentioned, almost as if they had never existed. The parents' intense fears, which were not verbalized, nonetheless trickled through to the children and permeated early nightmares, which the analysands later remembered. It becomes understandable, then, that the young man who had a deep impression made on him by the situation presented to him in the world-at-large could no longer put his complete trust in the reliability and affection of his familiar objects. The "strange" had established a barrier between him and his family. This picture was completely different among the few sons of Orthodox, nonassimilated families whom I got to know analytically. They had a powerful need, which carried over well beyond adolescence, to give themselves, despite the acquired stranger-identity, over again to the dependency and the security of their families, who also desired such a return to their home. A conscious ambivalence and an oscillation of the personal identity occurred. The deep, unconscious ambivalence, the feeling of not belonging to anything, of being marked with the hand of fate, however, did not come into awareness.
These circumstances are congruent with the observation we (Parin, Morgenthaler, and Parin-Matthèy, 1963) made with respect to the deculturation and enculturation of colonized peoples. Persons who were well integrated into their traditional family, who had built an identity solidly anchored to their traditions, were readily able to move into the new life situations forced on them; their sense of identity was well-established and elastic. Like the traditionally and religiously raised sons of Jewish families, they could move about among strangers without having to give up that which was trusted or familiar. Sons of Jewish families who had grown up in the absence of old traditions obviously had a more difficult time of it. They had to construct in their adolescence their own new adult identity, without being able to lean on the unbroken familial identity and membership in a "clan." They correspond to the "marginal men" of anthropologists, who stemmed from half-Europeanized families.

Focusing solely on the homosexual, one could suppose, with respect to the identity difficulties that cropped up in adolescence, that the blame rested on an original line of prelatency defects regarding the establishment of male sexual identity and which now became manifest for the first time. The resemblance to Jewish young men, who, under the pressure of social discrimination, really had the same identity problems, makes it clear that, as a rule, it could not have been the sequel of early sexual identity formation. Entry into the "strange", into the world at large,

brought with it, for the members of the minority in question, a strain that would not permit a well-developed sense of identity in childhood as long as the adolescents reencountered "the strange" within their own families. To attribute an early childhood identity defect to homosexuals is a misconception. Regression during the traumatically experienced adolescence can lead to the erroneous assumption of an early disruption of self-perception and self-differentiation despite an otherwise hardly disturbed environment. (4)

The experience common to Jews and to homosexuals is that they have to deal with "the strange" in adolescence as they enter a discriminating, potentially hostile environment in the outer world; they thereby could also not rely on returning safely to the bosom of their families of origin, irrespective of how their infancy and childhood had turned out. Hence, unavoidable specific conflicts from childhood are reactivated, or carried along, by the adolescent conflicts. The consequences to the sense of self-esteem (especially the feeling of not being lovable), to the establishment of an identity, and to the problems of dependency on and separation from love objects are the same for Jews and for homosexuals. Such are the circumstances that gave rise to the psychological similarities that made their appearance in the analysis.
The more solid the sense of self-esteem became in the course of the analysis, the more disturbing were attempts to deny discriminating peculiarities, to feel forced to disguise them. Certain of the homosexuals were envious of blacks, who, at least, were not tempted in a white environment to pretend to be white, while homosexuals time and time again were attempting to pass themselves off as heterosexuals. (5) Many Jewish adolescents and adults accentuate their belonging to the Jewish community through arrant display of their religious identity in their dress and hair style or by participation in religious ritual, motivated at times only by the wish not to give in to the temptation to deny their Jewish origins. In recent years, beyond political-nationalistic motives, participation in Zionism has had this additional, psychologically compensatory function. During the earlier formation of the sexual identity of the young male and during the establishment of self-esteem, the inadequacy or socially weak position of the father, especially at the beginning of latency, was

(4) Editors' note: See also Blos (1962, 1985).

(5) In reality, many blacks attempt within an ostracizing or hostile white environment to try to lighten their skin color with the aid of chemicals or other means or at least to straighten their curly hair

32

assumed to cause lasting self-deficiencies (Kohut, 1971). The exception to which I referred earlier, whereby the family structure of Jews and of homosexuals appeared to be strikingly the same, is that all Jewish and all homosexuals analysands came from distinctly matrifocal families. In such families, not only before the oedipal conflict but also subsequently, the mother, and not the father, provided the emotional center of the family. (6) Whether they thereby consequently differ from other patients is not clear. It was clear, however, that a distinct and significantly durable identification with a strong phallic father was not sufficient to compensate for the deficits in the previously mentioned self-cathexis. In fact, several of the Jews, as well as several of the homosexuals, actually had socially successful fathers who were loved and respected by their families and from whom they had consciously or unconsciously internalized a good many traits and attitudes. The analysands' development after adolescence, nevertheless, made it obvious that this core of self-esteem did not survive when they were exposed to the world outside the family. The "inborn defect" and the identification with the aggressive impact of the world around were stronger. The sense of not having had a proper father was often coupled with a deep sense of not having been loved "properly" by the mother and later, as an adult, of simply not being worthy of
love. It is not at all the case that my analysands consistently had unempathetic, cold mothers or that they were pushed aside or abandoned by the mother during phases of separation. Only a change of function of defenses against traumatic experiences with the mother (see Waelder, 1960) could explain in each case how a person's relatively undisturbed and happy infancy and early childhood could lead to such a deeply disturbed trust toward his fellow man. I can state with only slight exaggeration that in the analysis of homosexuals and Jews who grew up in a relatively permissive society, it is difficult to establish emotional accessibility and a sense of trust beyond all fears and projections. All these patients apparently suffered from a lack of "basic trust" (Erikson, 1950). After accurately perceiving the "strange" in their families and familial surround, they continued to find it factually around them in adulthood. It became my task to be the first trustworthy stranger.

Closely coupled, as if it were the other side of the coin, was a tendency to attribute every disappointment, insult, and even transparently self-defeating behavior to enemies and persecutors. I came to see this as an apparent paranoid projection. With regard to simple projections, the environment provided plenty of material for each -anti-Semites, anti-homosexuals with overtly and covertly discriminating attitudes. Often with Jews it was not their own experiences, but those of the parents, who had lived through all those years of Nazi repression and the Holocaust, that gave rise to the apprehensions and fears. But I speak about paranoid projections only when the mechanism of projective identification resulted in their suspecting everyone of being a persecutor and an enemy. One symbol, even the most trivial, would suffice for them to experience persecution as being the indisputable fact of the matter. On the other hand, projective identifications gave rise to typical "exceptions." Each Jew could recall at the very least one non-anti-Semitically oriented gentile, one friend, one esteemed author, one person who was the exception. The homosexuals also had had something to do at one time or another with a "hetero" "who really understood me." Obviously, because I was the analyst, my interpretations of the patient's manifold defensive maneuvers, including his perception and cathexis of me as a selfobject, made it possible for me to become for him a clearly delineated object that replicated the understanding exception.

(6) Editors' note: This phenomenon is well known from anthropological studies (Smith 1956; Kunstadter, 1963; Boyer, 1964).
This seemingly paranoid projection can be described differently. During the phase of reorientation in adolescence where a consolidation of good and bad object representations should occur, there ensued a tendency to divide or fragment all objects, a "splitting." The image of stranger was superimposed on trusted objects; the familiar was sought out in the strange, but the menacing stranger could always be found. Unfortunately, at the time of the analysis, I did not have as yet at my disposal the concept of the "representative of the stranger." It seems to me that the concept of that representation would have simplified the analysis of the seemingly deep-seated splitting. An actual or projectively perceived attack would for all these analysands lead to regressive repercussions regarding the self-image and self-cathexis. These processes, which stereotypically resulted in extreme lowering of their self-esteem, varied from one analysand and another. It was easy to perceive, as soon as an analysand felt himself to be attacked, criticized, or rejected by the analyst -as frequently happened -that only an anticipatory attack could be expected. One analysand experienced intense feelings of guilt, frequently transferred to the analyst as the representative of the superego or of a parent. Another had intense feelings of shame, sometimes with, sometimes without, feelings of guilt, and fantasies pertaining to sibling rivalry, oedipal conflict -and, especially frequently, pertaining to anal modalities of experience. Whenever he wanted to talk about a particular sexual experience, one homosexual analysand repeatedly felt quite intensely the shame he had experienced on his first day of school, when, filled with fear, he urinated and defecated in his pants in front of his classmates. Similarly, every time one of the Jewish analysands would read the word Jew or hear it on the radio, he remembered how he had once stood in front of the blackboard in grammar school and, unable to solve an arithmetic problem, had wet himself out of fear; the teacher then sent him from the classroom with a sarcastic remark. The majority of analysands, however, could not recall such feelings even after a lengthy period in analysis. Irrespective of the actual or fantasized aggression, they experienced themselves as small, weak, hideous, deformed, stunted, disgusting, and sometimes rotten, decayed, or poisonous. Their self-esteem yielded to a delusion of insignificance, with the following content: "I cannot be loved, I am not loveworthy; I must be loved, or else I will not survive." This was, at least temporarily, the end result of the regressive process, whether it evolved in conjunction with or without perceptible feelings of guilt or shame. Reactive aggressions were not possible at this time, probably because of extreme helplessness; they eventually made their appearance later, when the analysand felt himself to be less powerless, more secure, and more accepted by the analyst. On the other hand, lowering of self-esteem was often accompanied by fantasies of grandeur, during
which the adversary would be experienced as exceedingly powerful. Subsequently or concurrently, the defensive-manic actions of such fantasies might be accompanied by perceptions of the self as an exceedingly important person.

The regressive process showed, on one hand, significant differences between one patient and another. The result, however, was oddly uniform: These very different persons subjugated themselves to their "birth flaw," to the conviction that they were not lovable and to the lowering of their self-image. I have explained these differences of the regressive process in the following way: that quite different stages in child development were brought back and triggered different conflict-laden experiences. Social discrimination has stirred up and mobilized the bad, evil, disgusting, and finally nonhuman, and hence hateworthy, "strange" in one's own self. Only empathy, love to the point of symbolically being one with another, is capable of reversing this decay at such moments.

The analyses to which I refer included, with the exception of two, analysands who suffered from the so-called classic neuroses that were formerly called transference neuroses. One of the Jews suffered from a sadomasochistic sexual perversion. One of the homosexuals would today be diagnosed as having a borderline disorder. After all, not only the symptoms, but also the whole problem set, were so dissimilar that it is impossible to sum up in this brief space the tracks of social discrimination that reached far into the unconscious life. I have to trust that what has been said will bring attention to regressive patterns of such analysands. The whole development of the psyche becomes subjugated in adolescence to a new "conflictualization," which might make the most varied developmental steps appear to be the result of fixation. It is in the sense of a regressive new investment of libido and aggression that varied symptoms surface. Such symptoms were frequently traced back during the analyses by the analysands to personal experiences in their childhood that had nothing to do with adult life in the social arena or with the "strange" versus the "family." Denial, overcompensation, and, above all, isolation of the inner life regarding disturbing and wounding social experiences are at least as frequent as the opposite, where repressed childhood conflicts would be explained by social experiences which served the adult as displacement-equivalents for later events.

Let me give an example of isolation and denial of actual experiences with social discrimination: the repetition compulsion frequently made its appearance in the form of the assumption of the position of the rejected third party. During the analysis it appeared at first as if Jews transferred their unresolved oedipal conflict onto their love lives, even when that was not so. For instance, a
love affair ended because a non-Jewish girl, under pressure from her family, abandoned her Jewish lover and chose a Gentile. Analogously, in the unfortunate choice of a homosexual lover it was not easy to determine whether the "repetition-compulsion" was attributable to outer circumstances. In every instance, my task was to counteract the mechanism of isolation, which separates the strange from the familiar, the social from the inner life. Once this was accomplished, it was possible to reconstruct the way in which this entanglement had taken place and where it had led. A reorientation of the ego was not possible without paying attention to the adolescence and without elucidating the representation of the stranger. With these analysands too the success of the analysis was due to the broadening of conscious experience and a reorganization of defense. A few peculiarities are worth mentioning. With the Jews, as well as the homosexuals, the success of analyzing two mechanisms of defense, the denial of actually suffered humiliations, and the aforementioned isolation of inner and outer conflict became immediately apparent. The delusional fantasy of a "birth flaw," of an "irremediable defect," disappeared, and a better cathexis and differentiation of the self were brought about. The analysands were able to distinguish between their own longings, and their fears, and the ideological climate that confronted them, and they were better able to endure the contradiction between their own needs and the demands of the society in which they lived.

With their improved autonomy, the Jewish analysands modified and revised many of their attitudes against their families, as well as against their tradition and religion, by the end of their analyses. They belonged to a genuine group (a minority) that was so minimally demarcated from the larger society that each person and each family should have been able to choose for themselves between participation or membership and distance or separateness.

That the homosexuals enjoyed, for the first time, improvement with respect to a previously highly impaired autonomy is apparently at variance with Morgenthaler's (1984) finding that even during the early childhood development of homosexuals there exists a "feeling of a particular inner and outer autonomy" that is sustained "in a certain way through overcathexis of the autoerotic" (p. 340). The special need of homosexual boys to become cognizant of their own autonomy and to confirm it over and over again is an important factor in their harmonious psychic development. The same psychic features that represent the best possible solution in childhood can turn out to be embarrassing in adulthood or even compress as neurotic symptoms (Hartmann, 1954; A. Freud, 1965). Precisely because homosexuals are entirely reliant on their autonomy, it is detrimental for them to be hopelessly exposed to hidden social discrimination. As soon as they are better
differentiated, provided their self-esteem and feeling of identity have improved, they must also revise their place of belonging. Since homosexuals do not represent a genuine group, but a *formed subculture* among us, each one must arrange by himself his social behavior and his social position as far as possible according to his needs.

IV

I have no doubt that social forces act on the analysands belonging to two such dissimilar groups and endow them with a psychological similarity. Although Jews owe their otherness to their familial origins, while homosexuals -if indeed they did bonded together first during adolescence or later in a group, the subculture known as the "homosexual scene," they were discriminated as beings of another kind, persecuted as a collective, and hurt as individuals.

37

My observations did not make it possible for me to be able to speak about the collective psychology of these groups. Certainly such research would be of great interest. As early as 1943 Loewenstein (1951) characterized anti-Semitism as a collective delusion. Since the founding of Israel, the Jewish community has undergone deep psychological changes. Loewenstein labeled Jews and anti-Semites a "cultural pair," with the anti-Semite being the aggressor and sadistic partner and the Jew being the victim, the assailable one, the masochist. This characterization did not hold any relevance for my analysands, who lived in a relatively permissive society. Nor does it apply to the state of Israel. Instead, one could say that the belligerent nationalism that has been declared to be essential for reasons of security, as well as the reckless political and social aggression that has characterized both Israeli politics and the lives of the Israelis themselves, are traceable back to a collectively effective, compensatory reparation of self-esteem. Ostensibly inalienable rights and aspirations are adopted, comparable to a narcissistic plug, as if nothing else could compensate for a deep wrong, a narcissistic wound afflicted upon the self-esteem. From my research, I can only conclude that even an acceptable form of social discrimination is capable of bringing about deep-seated damage to self-esteem and identity. Whether one can impute such compensations to the collective will have to be researched by social psychologists who are close enough to be able to feel empathetic, but from whom the Israeli culture is foreign enough to be able to view it with an ethnologist's eye. (7)

As regards the collective psychology of homosexuals, there is little to conclude from this particular research. Certainly there exists for them a need to join together into collectives, which is the case for every group that is discriminated against, and to enter into collective, identificatory
relationships. In the course of my observations, obstacles that stand in the way of bonding came readily into view.

Finally, these few observations regarding these two subcultures in the end should point once again to the deeply rooted difference of Jews and homosexuals. I can imagine that some and not only members of these groups -will find my research tasteless, or worse still, even discriminatory, with respect to one, the other, or both of the groups. It can happen that I, who both belong and do not belong, am made out to be the camouflaged stranger or the traitor, and the corresponding aggression is transferred onto me. Possibly, the critics can be pacified by referring to some well-known facts. There is a nearly ubiquitous tendency, common


38 to every culture, to view one's own as the legitimate one, even as the only genuinely human one. Consequently, the strange is not only faulty and noxious, but even not human. Well known are tribes whose names mean human being, or "the people." We clearly make use of the other, the stranger, the nonhuman to delimit and fix our own identity. Some of the greatest cultures, unfortunately including our own, have psychological needs, even within their own community, for what is alien, other, or nonhuman. (8) A field of projection is wrought by way of the unremitting erection of boundaries that results in experiencing one's own identity as stronger, more just, and better. In case the outsider behaves nonconformingly, there is the opportunity to direct aggression toward him, toward the stranger. In a relatively tolerant society, homosexuals and Jews have to fear the strange, which besets them on the outside as well as within their own family. In their adolescence they are face to face with the strange; it lurks from behind and has even established itself inside.

(8) Editors' note: see Volkan (1988).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


